|zpravodaj ČSKI - únor 2019 |
datum: 27.2.2019 v 16:00
název: Identity and definition in natural deduction
přednášející: Ansten Klev (FLU CAS)
místo konání: UI, 2.patro, místnost č.318
souhrn: Recall that in natural deduction each primitive constant is equipped with introduction and elimination rules. Such rules can be given not only for the logical connectives and the quantifiers, but also for the identity predicate: its introduction rule is the reflexivity axiom, t = t, and its elimination rule is the indiscernibility of identicals. Although a normalization theorem can be proved for the resulting system, one might not be entirely satisfied with this treatment of identity, especially if one adheres to the idea going back to Gentzen that the meaning of a primitive constant is determined by its introduction rule(s). Firstly, it is not obvious that the introduction rule for the identity predicate is strong enough to justify its elimination rule. Secondly, it is not clear what to say about definitions taking the form of equations. Such definitions are usually regarded as axioms, hence they must be additional introduction rules for the identity predicate. Since definitions are particular to theories, it follows that the meaning of the identity predicate changes from one theory to the other. I will show that by enriching natural deduction with a theory of definitional identity we can answer both of these worries: we can justify the elimination rule on the basis of the introduction rule, and we can extend any theory with definitions while keeping the reflexivity axiom as the only introduction rule for the identity predicate.